The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush

Among the many, many charms in this book is that it lives up to the standard that David Herbert Donald set for himself in his biography of Lincoln. This standard is one that, in turn, JFK had set for Donald and his historian brethren: '[Kennedy] voiced his deep dissatisfaction with the glib way the historians had rated some of his predecessors as "Below Average" and marked a few as "Failures." Thinking, no doubt, of how his own administration would look in the backward glance of history, he resented the whole process. With real feeling he said, "No one has a right to grade a President -- not even poor James Buchanan -- who has not sat in his chair, examined the mail and information that came across his desk, and learned why he made his decisions."' The Politics Presidents Make is a source book for the sort of historian that JFK would have loved to groom. From President Adams through the first George Bush, Stephen Skowronek studies the problems that defined each president's tenure, and finds himself deeply sympathetic to all of them. The trouble in John Quincy Adams's presidential tenure, for instance, is that he was essentially trying to hold together the old patrician order that the founding fathers had established, while a new era of party-centered politics was on its way in. It took Andrew Jackson -- the founder of the spoils system -- to midwife the partisan revolution. Or take Herbert Hoover, the classic (to modern eyes) failed president. First of all, Skowronek reminds us, Hoover tried a lot of things before collapsing into inaction in the midst of the Depression; Skowronek says that modern historians have raised some doubts that the New Deal was very new at all (though he doesn't say this with much confidence). Hoover's big problem, says Skowronek, was that he tried to hold together the strains of his ideology even as he systematically violated its tenets: he came in believing in an American System uniquely combining the free-enterprise system with a limited government, then expanded the government's role little by little until his original beliefs were hardly recognizable. Yet he insisted that his policies weren't the least bit innovative, and that they still conformed to the American System. As Skowronek puts it, "Hoover himself would never accept the notion that his actions were opening the door to the displacement of the old order and thus he could never link his initiatives with the promise of constructing a new one." The grand arc connecting every president, says Skowronek, is the relation they bear to the existing order, and how durable that order is. A president like Hoover, who's a defender of the existing vulnerable regime, is a "disjunctive" president. Hoover's successor, there to overthrow the vulnerable regime, is a "reconstructive" president. After the reconstructive presidents, we typically get a line of "articulating" presidents; after Roosevelt, these are presidents like Eisenhower and Johnson who rule at a time when th

Stephen Skowronek wants to change how we judge the success of our Presidents. His major contribution to that understanding is to turn our attention away from the individual holding the office. Instead he wants us to focus on a combination of political, social and institutional factors. Perhaps the best way to introduce his theory is to start off with his observation that in general, "power has been less of a problem for presidents than authority" (p.17). In other words, it is easier to get things done then to sustain the justification of the action taken. In fact, Skowronek (hereafter called S.) feels that it in the ability of a president to "control the political definition of their actions" that will determine "the terms in which their places in history are understood" (ibid.) Furthermore, S. sees that the power and authority have changed over the span of American history according to different arcs of development. S. sees the power of the presidency as being in the resources available to the office at any one moment and distinguishes that history of change (toward more resources and toward more independent use of those resources) as occuring in secular time. Authority refers to the way a president is expected by his contemporaries to use the resources of his office. The historical arc of change of authority structures, S. sees as taking place in political time (p.30). The final key to understanding S.'s theory is his insistance on the inherently disruptive and creative nature of the office of the presidency. This is something that he insists on time and time again throughout the book (the first instance is on p.xii). Every president imposes themselves on the office in such a way as to change (disrupt) the current political order. How they frame doing so greatly determines the extent to which their authority to do so is challenged. Here is where it gets interesting. Some presidents have been elected with a clear warrant for radical change in the political order. Some are elected to continue down an established path. S. imposes order on all this with a simple two by two box on p. 36. A president arrives in office either affliated with or opposed to the current regime. That regime is either vulnerable or resiliant. A president who arrives opposed to a current regime that is vulnerable has a chance to practice what S. calls the politics of reconstruction. S. examines as examples the presidencies of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, F.D.R., and Reagan. This is the politics of greatness. If they arrive opposed to a current regime that is resiliant, the president is mired in the politics of preemption. S. sees as examples of this situation to be the presidencies of John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, (maybe) Grover Cleveland, (maybe) Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon and (somewhat) Bill Clinton. If a president arrives affiliated with a resiliant regime, he is an examplar of the politics of articulation. S discusses as examples of this James Monroe, James Polk,

Skowronek has written a magesterial study of the American presidency, fundamentally reinterpreting it through a novel historical framework. His writing style is very dense, and often unclear - but the hard work necessary to understand him is well worth the effort. I first read this as an undergraduate, then twice again in graduate school. Each reading brought out new insights I missed the previous time. No student of the presidency can afford not to read this. Quibble with him on some details, perhaps, but overall no one can doubt its lasting importance. An instant classic.

This is definitely a difficult book, and understanding certain critical passages may require several readings. In short, this is NOT a good book for an introduction to presidential politics and leadership. For a more readable and still highly regarded account, Neustadt's seminal work is a good choice. However, none of this is to say that Skowronek's book is not brilliant--it is, and reading it carefully is a very profitable experience and will enhance anyone's understanding of the presidency, agree with Professor Skowronek or not. Through all the technical references, Skowronek proposes a paradigm for assessing presidential leadership: Reconstruction, Disjunction, Articulation, and Pre-emption, all of which are based on the nature of the government and its commitments (vulnerable or resilient) and on the president's relationship to that regime (opposed or affiliated). Reconstruction results when presidents are opposed to a vulnerable regime--here are the "great" presidents: Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan, for example. Affiliation with a vulnerable regime produces Disjunction. Articulation results from affiliation with a resilient regime. And Pre-emption is the product of opposition to a resilient regime. Of course, this merely scratches the surface of Skowronek's argument, for which he argues quite well and which he approaches from a fairly historical perspective. I highly recommend this for anyone wishing to gain a deeper, fuller understanding of presidential leadership, especially in considering how much a president's skills affect what type of leader he is and how much circumstances shape his presidency.

In "The Politics Presidents Make,"Stephen Skowronek presents a sweeping indictment of the Neustadtian view on presidential leadership made famous in Richard Neustadt's classic text, "Presidential Power." Skowronek challenges Neustadt's assertion that presidents after FDR represent a distinct group of incumbents, who, because of the constant challenges of modernity, cannot make due with the formal powers of the president--which is a mere "clerkship"-- and must instead utilize informal authority to "get things done," something "pre-modern" presidents did not have to do consistently. Skowronek views such a notion as a conceit of modern times, and he incorporates "pre-modern" presidents into his analytical framework, which gives the reader a better understanding of the presidency as it is weighed against the emergent structures of power and in relation to the recurrent structures of authority. Skowronek also disputes the idea that each president is at liberty to "be as big as he can be." The differences in "great" presidents and "incompetent" presidents arises not out of differences in skills-- i.e. bargaining ability-- but instead out of differing political identities vis-a-vis the current political order. Because the presidency is, in constitutional terms, an order shattering, order-affirming, and order-creating political institution, successful presidents are those-- like Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan-- who are able to reconcile the order-shattering and order-affirming impulses by creating new standards for constitutional governance. This type of leadership stance-- reconstructive leadership-- is the most potent form of leadership because it allows for a reconciling of the order-shattering and order-affirming aspects of the presidency, which enables such incumbents to legitmate their actions, the key to successful leadership. Skowronek has written a superb book-- one of the best books on the presidency ever written-- and it is valuable because it correctly identifies legitimacy as the most important aspect of leadership and not skills.